July 11, 2024
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Written by: African Politics
- July 1, 2017
According to Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe in his words, “while I
was trying to get the OAU to settle the dispute so they could go to the
conference table, Chief Obafemi Awolowo led Federal Government of Nigeria were thinking of legalism”.
More so they
left the impression, you see, that Nigeria wanted to annihilate the Igbo’s. Due to the diplomatic blunder by the then Commissioner for External Affairs Dr.
Okoi Arikpo.
“Yes. I played a prominent role in Biafra for the unity
of the country in order to restore peace and bring about unity of the country.
That’s the role I played. I advised Ojukwu. I said well look, you have declared
secession. What we should do is to get the elder statesmen and women of the
nation to reconcile you and Gowon. I said by declaring secession, you get so
many people who do not believe you to remain there. You see all of us were
interned. As we were interned then, we couldn’t express our own views as we see
it because, he made Decree Number 5 which vested absolute powers in himself and
if you were against his views, it then constituted an act of subversion and the
penalty was death by shooting. Well, it was a war-time measure and that is
understandable. So, I advised him. I said go to the conference table and iron
out your differences. Allow elder statesmen and elder stateswomen to bring the
two of you to the conference table and settle this matter so that there will no
more be civil war and the country may be united. He agreed. But Gowon was
advised by the Ministry of External Affairs to insist on pre-conditions. That
is that before he could negotiate with the secessionists, that they must accept
certain terms; accept the 12-state structure and all. So, it was quite obvious
that the Federal Government wanted Biafra to come to the conference table with
their hands tied and their feet tied. But they won’t be free agents. That was
the diplomatic mistake on the part of the Federal Government. So, when they did
that, then Lt- Col. Ojukwu told me, “How can I go to the conference table based
on these ultimatums?”
Still I advised Ojukwu to go to the OAU and ask them to use
their good offices to settle the dispute and that we should avoid loss of
lives. He accepted my advice in good faith. Then he said, ‘Now, you have some
heads of state in Africa who are your friends, would you mind going to appeal
to them to use their good offices so that the Nigerian civil war could be an
item on the agenda for OAU summit in Kinshasa?’ I said I would gladly go. So he
sent me to Monrovia as a peace envoy. I went there and met my friend, President
Tubman. Tubman expressed his willingness to use his good offices. He told me he
would see another mutual friend, the late Haile Sellassie, Emperor of Ethiopia,
and both of them would see that the civil war was placed as first item on the
agenda of the OAU Summit in Kinshasa.
their good offices to settle the dispute and that we should avoid loss of
lives. He accepted my advice in good faith. Then he said, ‘Now, you have some
heads of state in Africa who are your friends, would you mind going to appeal
to them to use their good offices so that the Nigerian civil war could be an
item on the agenda for OAU summit in Kinshasa?’ I said I would gladly go. So he
sent me to Monrovia as a peace envoy. I went there and met my friend, President
Tubman. Tubman expressed his willingness to use his good offices. He told me he
would see another mutual friend, the late Haile Sellassie, Emperor of Ethiopia,
and both of them would see that the civil war was placed as first item on the
agenda of the OAU Summit in Kinshasa.
I returned and broke the news to Ojukwu. He was very
pleased. Then, when the OAU summit opened, Chief Awolowo, as Vice-Chairman of
the Federal Executive Council and Commissioner for Finance, led a strong
Nigerian delegation to Kinshasa and raised a very strong objective on the
Nigerian civil war being placed as an item on the agenda on the grounds that
according to the OAU Charter, this was a domestic affairs and member states
were precluded from interfering in the domestic affairs of each other, which
was really sound according to international law. But we wanted to solve it in
the African way, to use mediation and conciliation to bring two warring
brothers together.
pleased. Then, when the OAU summit opened, Chief Awolowo, as Vice-Chairman of
the Federal Executive Council and Commissioner for Finance, led a strong
Nigerian delegation to Kinshasa and raised a very strong objective on the
Nigerian civil war being placed as an item on the agenda on the grounds that
according to the OAU Charter, this was a domestic affairs and member states
were precluded from interfering in the domestic affairs of each other, which
was really sound according to international law. But we wanted to solve it in
the African way, to use mediation and conciliation to bring two warring
brothers together.
The OAU accepted the submission of Chief Awolowo and so it
was not put into the agenda. Well, history will show now between Chief Awolowo
and myself, who actually accentuated the war. I was trying to get the OAU to
settle the dispute so they could go to the conference table and he was thinking
of legalism, that it would amount to interference in the domestic affairs of a
member-state. But meanwhile here you have two brothers killing each other.
was not put into the agenda. Well, history will show now between Chief Awolowo
and myself, who actually accentuated the war. I was trying to get the OAU to
settle the dispute so they could go to the conference table and he was thinking
of legalism, that it would amount to interference in the domestic affairs of a
member-state. But meanwhile here you have two brothers killing each other.
Well, Ojukwu told me, I have done my best. You see, Nigeria
was relying on law and we are relying on humanity. What’s next? I said why not
try other heads of states and see what could be done to bring about peace? He
then said he left the initiative with me. I suggested going to some heads of
state and see what can be done. But his advisers led by Dr. Nwakama Okoro
suggested recognition. That if we can get other states to recognize Biafra,
maybe the hands of Nigeria may be forced to go to the conference table.
was relying on law and we are relying on humanity. What’s next? I said why not
try other heads of states and see what could be done to bring about peace? He
then said he left the initiative with me. I suggested going to some heads of
state and see what can be done. But his advisers led by Dr. Nwakama Okoro
suggested recognition. That if we can get other states to recognize Biafra,
maybe the hands of Nigeria may be forced to go to the conference table.
Well, I thought that was a sound idea and I placed my
services at their disposal so as to meet my friends. We had in mind President
Senghor of Senegal, President Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, President Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, President Milton Obote of Uganda, President Kenneth Kaunda
of Zambia and of course Francois Bongo, he is now Omar. He now has become a
Muslim. He was then a Christian. The long and short of it all was that I and
these great African statesmen agreed that if Gowon persisted with pre-conditions,
then they would accord recognition to force the hands of Gowon to go to the
conference table and bring about peace. That was one.
services at their disposal so as to meet my friends. We had in mind President
Senghor of Senegal, President Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, President Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, President Milton Obote of Uganda, President Kenneth Kaunda
of Zambia and of course Francois Bongo, he is now Omar. He now has become a
Muslim. He was then a Christian. The long and short of it all was that I and
these great African statesmen agreed that if Gowon persisted with pre-conditions,
then they would accord recognition to force the hands of Gowon to go to the
conference table and bring about peace. That was one.
Two, Gowon had already predicted that the war would end on
March 31 and as far as these African statesmen were concerned, these killings
and atrocities did not do any credit to the image of Africa and as such what
should be done was to stop it as soon as possible. Therefore, if the war didn’t
end by March 31, then the propaganda of ‘Biafra’ that it was an act of genocide
would be justified. And they didn’t want to accept that.
March 31 and as far as these African statesmen were concerned, these killings
and atrocities did not do any credit to the image of Africa and as such what
should be done was to stop it as soon as possible. Therefore, if the war didn’t
end by March 31, then the propaganda of ‘Biafra’ that it was an act of genocide
would be justified. And they didn’t want to accept that.
I went on this mission and succeeded in persuading these
heads of state to agree to give recognition just to force the hands of Nigeria,
diplomatically speaking, to the conference table.
heads of state to agree to give recognition just to force the hands of Nigeria,
diplomatically speaking, to the conference table.
President Senghor said he couldn’t because the majority of
his supporters were Muslims and rightly or wrongly they felt it was a religious
war. And he said well, if he granted recognition, then his government would
fall. But he supported the idea of forcing the hands of Nigeria to the
conference table. Houphouet Boigny was prepared, provided his people backed
him. Ditto for the others except Milton Obote who told us that Prince Mutesa
and the Bagandans wanted to secede and he couldn’t support secession when his
own state was confronted with similar problems. It left four of them. That is,
President Nyerere, Houphouet Boigny, Kaunda and Bongo. They agreed on the
understanding that the war did not end by March 31, 1968 and pre-conditions
would be removed to make it easy for both Ojukwu and Gowon to go to conference
table.
his supporters were Muslims and rightly or wrongly they felt it was a religious
war. And he said well, if he granted recognition, then his government would
fall. But he supported the idea of forcing the hands of Nigeria to the
conference table. Houphouet Boigny was prepared, provided his people backed
him. Ditto for the others except Milton Obote who told us that Prince Mutesa
and the Bagandans wanted to secede and he couldn’t support secession when his
own state was confronted with similar problems. It left four of them. That is,
President Nyerere, Houphouet Boigny, Kaunda and Bongo. They agreed on the
understanding that the war did not end by March 31, 1968 and pre-conditions
would be removed to make it easy for both Ojukwu and Gowon to go to conference
table.
So they granted recognition and it worked like magic because
immediately after this, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, who must be presumed to be responsible
for this diplomatic blunder (he was the Commissioner for External Affairs]—a
good man no doubt, but he is a very poor diplomat in my own humble opinion –
announced to the outside world that Nigeria would no longer insist on
pre-conditions and that he was prepared for conference table but the war did
not end on March 31 and so, they left the impression, you see, that Nigeria
wanted to annihilate the Ibos. You noticed the Soviets gave Nigeria more arms
and Nigeria used those arms to destroy the secessionists. Here, I came in again
and I advised Ojukwu. I said look since Gowon has withdrawn the pre-conditions,
go to the conference table and argue the points so as to pave way for a peace
conference. It was agreed that they should meet in Niamey. I advised Ojukwu to
go. Again Gowon was ill-advised so he couldn’t come.
immediately after this, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, who must be presumed to be responsible
for this diplomatic blunder (he was the Commissioner for External Affairs]—a
good man no doubt, but he is a very poor diplomat in my own humble opinion –
announced to the outside world that Nigeria would no longer insist on
pre-conditions and that he was prepared for conference table but the war did
not end on March 31 and so, they left the impression, you see, that Nigeria
wanted to annihilate the Ibos. You noticed the Soviets gave Nigeria more arms
and Nigeria used those arms to destroy the secessionists. Here, I came in again
and I advised Ojukwu. I said look since Gowon has withdrawn the pre-conditions,
go to the conference table and argue the points so as to pave way for a peace
conference. It was agreed that they should meet in Niamey. I advised Ojukwu to
go. Again Gowon was ill-advised so he couldn’t come.
At Niamey here was Ojukwu. I was on his side. Gowon wasn’t
there but Haile Sellassie, Hamani Diori, Tubman and General Akran were there
representing OAU. So, I told Ojukwu, I said now you have an upper hand. These
respected leaders of the OAU were there. I had briefed Ojukwu. I said ‘look
your line of approach is to express appreciation for what the OAU was doing in
order to maintain peace in Africa but you were prepared to co-operate and you
are leaving the whole matter in the hands of the OAU to see what could be done
to bring an earlier cessation of hostilities. I said just say that and thank
them and sit down.
there but Haile Sellassie, Hamani Diori, Tubman and General Akran were there
representing OAU. So, I told Ojukwu, I said now you have an upper hand. These
respected leaders of the OAU were there. I had briefed Ojukwu. I said ‘look
your line of approach is to express appreciation for what the OAU was doing in
order to maintain peace in Africa but you were prepared to co-operate and you
are leaving the whole matter in the hands of the OAU to see what could be done
to bring an earlier cessation of hostilities. I said just say that and thank
them and sit down.
Now Gowon didn’t attend. He sent a junior man, I think
Alhaji Femi Okunnu or so, to represent him. And they didn’t even attend this
conference at which the four heads of state presided. It was only the Biafran
side. So Ojukwu won a diplomatic victory and you know Ojukwu is a very good
speaker if you give him all the facts. He was a good public relations expert
and he won. He said, ‘well if Gowon was sincere why did he spite such great men
and didn’t attend?’ That worked.
Alhaji Femi Okunnu or so, to represent him. And they didn’t even attend this
conference at which the four heads of state presided. It was only the Biafran
side. So Ojukwu won a diplomatic victory and you know Ojukwu is a very good
speaker if you give him all the facts. He was a good public relations expert
and he won. He said, ‘well if Gowon was sincere why did he spite such great men
and didn’t attend?’ That worked.
They agreed that Nigeria could be contacted so that we have
a peace conference in Addis Ababa. It was a diplomatic victory for Biafra and
so we returned to Biafra highly elated. And Ojukwu insisted that I should
accompany him to Addis Ababa. Then something happened. Some of his advisers
felt that I was becoming a victim of compromise and that I was a bad influence.
That all I was trying to do was to make Biafra impotent. They told Ojukwu that
Biafra was holding its own militarily. And why should we want a peace
conference? That he should be very, very careful with me, especially as an
Onitsha man because they thought that I was using him as a means to give
publicity for myself internationally and that time will come when people will
look more to me than to himself.
a peace conference in Addis Ababa. It was a diplomatic victory for Biafra and
so we returned to Biafra highly elated. And Ojukwu insisted that I should
accompany him to Addis Ababa. Then something happened. Some of his advisers
felt that I was becoming a victim of compromise and that I was a bad influence.
That all I was trying to do was to make Biafra impotent. They told Ojukwu that
Biafra was holding its own militarily. And why should we want a peace
conference? That he should be very, very careful with me, especially as an
Onitsha man because they thought that I was using him as a means to give
publicity for myself internationally and that time will come when people will
look more to me than to himself.
Well, as a young man, human, he fell for such flattery. I
don’t want to mention all the names, but particularly influential in swinging
his opinion at that material time was Mr. C. C. Mojekwu, who was based in
Lisbon. Then Mr. Matthew Mbu was our Commissioner for External Affairs and he
himself did as much as possible, but then he realized that he was having
someone who has power of life and death over everybody. So, we went to Addis
Ababa and on the night before the conference, Matthew came to my bedroom at
about 10 in the night. He said, “Do you know that all we have done, this man is
going to undo them tomorrow?’ I said ‘No’. Then he brought out a printed
version of a long speech. The world press said it lasted for 90 minutes.
don’t want to mention all the names, but particularly influential in swinging
his opinion at that material time was Mr. C. C. Mojekwu, who was based in
Lisbon. Then Mr. Matthew Mbu was our Commissioner for External Affairs and he
himself did as much as possible, but then he realized that he was having
someone who has power of life and death over everybody. So, we went to Addis
Ababa and on the night before the conference, Matthew came to my bedroom at
about 10 in the night. He said, “Do you know that all we have done, this man is
going to undo them tomorrow?’ I said ‘No’. Then he brought out a printed
version of a long speech. The world press said it lasted for 90 minutes.
He [Ojukwu] went back on everything we discussed. He
attacked the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union – all the
nations of the world and the OAU, and said that they were misleading us and that
the sovereignty of ‘Biafra’ was not negotiable. We went to the conference. I
sat next to him. I thought that he was going to speak in accordance with the
spirit of Niamey. But he spoke for 90 minutes and he just got the whole place
upside down.
attacked the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union – all the
nations of the world and the OAU, and said that they were misleading us and that
the sovereignty of ‘Biafra’ was not negotiable. We went to the conference. I
sat next to him. I thought that he was going to speak in accordance with the
spirit of Niamey. But he spoke for 90 minutes and he just got the whole place
upside down.
Naturally Tony Enahoro – he led the Nigerian delegation –
replied in kind and so we were back to square one. So, when we returned, I
advised him. I told him that I was surprised at what he did but it was not
late. He said, ‘The sovereignty of Biafra is not negotiable and if anybody
should try to compromise that sovereignty, then it will be an act of
subversion.’ Well, that was quite clear to me so I said, ‘Your Excellency, you
still have Port Harcourt and you can still bargain from position of strength –
after all, the main issue in the civil war is oil and they say that in
international politics, oil is combustible and as you have a combustible
situation you can begin from the position of strength’. He said, ‘No, Port
Harcourt is impregnable.’ ‘Very well, Your Excellency,’ I said. I went back to
Nekede where I had been in protective custody since February, 1968. Two weeks
later, Port Harcourt fell.
replied in kind and so we were back to square one. So, when we returned, I
advised him. I told him that I was surprised at what he did but it was not
late. He said, ‘The sovereignty of Biafra is not negotiable and if anybody
should try to compromise that sovereignty, then it will be an act of
subversion.’ Well, that was quite clear to me so I said, ‘Your Excellency, you
still have Port Harcourt and you can still bargain from position of strength –
after all, the main issue in the civil war is oil and they say that in
international politics, oil is combustible and as you have a combustible
situation you can begin from the position of strength’. He said, ‘No, Port
Harcourt is impregnable.’ ‘Very well, Your Excellency,’ I said. I went back to
Nekede where I had been in protective custody since February, 1968. Two weeks
later, Port Harcourt fell.
He sent for me. I said, ‘Well, Your Excellency, I did warn
you. You cannot now negotiate from a position of strength but having received
recognition from four states, we can still use them to see what we can do to
appeal to the outside world.’ He said, ‘Very well, I think you should go to the
United Nations to seek for recognition.’ I said, ‘Your Excellency, let us wait until
after OAU summit in Algiers and find out what Africa thinks.’ In the meantime,
I went to Tunisia to see my friend Habeeb Bourguiba of Tunisia. He wasn’t quite
well, so we moved from Carthage to Hermit where he stayed. Ojukwu had always
said the civil war would be won on the battlefield and not on the conference
table, and Bourguiba didn’t take kindly to that. He said don’t you people
advise this young man? I explained to him that I have done everything I could
to advise him, but he insists on going to the battle field.
you. You cannot now negotiate from a position of strength but having received
recognition from four states, we can still use them to see what we can do to
appeal to the outside world.’ He said, ‘Very well, I think you should go to the
United Nations to seek for recognition.’ I said, ‘Your Excellency, let us wait until
after OAU summit in Algiers and find out what Africa thinks.’ In the meantime,
I went to Tunisia to see my friend Habeeb Bourguiba of Tunisia. He wasn’t quite
well, so we moved from Carthage to Hermit where he stayed. Ojukwu had always
said the civil war would be won on the battlefield and not on the conference
table, and Bourguiba didn’t take kindly to that. He said don’t you people
advise this young man? I explained to him that I have done everything I could
to advise him, but he insists on going to the battle field.
So we crossed our fingers awaiting the verdict of Algiers.
You know it was decided by 33 to 4 in favour of Nigeria. I advised Ojukwu that
to go to the United Nations to seek recognition would be unrealistic since
Africa had decided by 33 to 4 in favour of Nigeria. I said Nigerian envoys, the
Nigerian delegations, would just percolate the membership of the United Nations
and they would frown at the whole thing. He insisted. I was then in Paris. I
wrote him a letter. I said, ‘Since you refuse to go to the conference table to
negotiate for peace, since you prefer that the civil war should end on the
battle field and not on the conference table; since you said that the
sovereignty of Biafra is not negotiable, I am afraid I cannot continue as a peace
envoy because you have destroyed all the vestiges of any optimism for peace.
Therefore I am relieving myself of my services as a peace envoy. I cannot
continue as a peace envoy. I cannot continue as a peace envoy because you have
let me down. You left me under the impression that if I succeeded in getting
recognition you will go to the conference table. You got four recognitions; you
did not go to the conference table. I am therefore going to London on exile.’
You know it was decided by 33 to 4 in favour of Nigeria. I advised Ojukwu that
to go to the United Nations to seek recognition would be unrealistic since
Africa had decided by 33 to 4 in favour of Nigeria. I said Nigerian envoys, the
Nigerian delegations, would just percolate the membership of the United Nations
and they would frown at the whole thing. He insisted. I was then in Paris. I
wrote him a letter. I said, ‘Since you refuse to go to the conference table to
negotiate for peace, since you prefer that the civil war should end on the
battle field and not on the conference table; since you said that the
sovereignty of Biafra is not negotiable, I am afraid I cannot continue as a peace
envoy because you have destroyed all the vestiges of any optimism for peace.
Therefore I am relieving myself of my services as a peace envoy. I cannot
continue as a peace envoy. I cannot continue as a peace envoy because you have
let me down. You left me under the impression that if I succeeded in getting
recognition you will go to the conference table. You got four recognitions; you
did not go to the conference table. I am therefore going to London on exile.’
I went to London in voluntary exile and the British
government granted me asylum. I do not see how anybody could say that I ran
away from my country. I crossed the Atlantic 46 times, trying to negotiate with
various heads of state so that they could grant recognition or make OAU to
settle the dispute. How could the head of state turn round now and accuse all
those who were politicians in pre-1966 and post-1966 as being responsible for
the downfall of the republic? I did my best to preserve the unity of Nigeria
and also to preserve the lives of old men, able-bodied men and women and
children but I failed. What could I do? I went on free exile and they keep
saying that I was among those responsible for the downfall of the republic. I
plead not guilty”.
government granted me asylum. I do not see how anybody could say that I ran
away from my country. I crossed the Atlantic 46 times, trying to negotiate with
various heads of state so that they could grant recognition or make OAU to
settle the dispute. How could the head of state turn round now and accuse all
those who were politicians in pre-1966 and post-1966 as being responsible for
the downfall of the republic? I did my best to preserve the unity of Nigeria
and also to preserve the lives of old men, able-bodied men and women and
children but I failed. What could I do? I went on free exile and they keep
saying that I was among those responsible for the downfall of the republic. I
plead not guilty”.
Excerpts from the interview he granted to New Nigerian
Newspapers, 1979, as Presidential aspirant under the platform of Nigerian
People’s Party.
Newspapers, 1979, as Presidential aspirant under the platform of Nigerian
People’s Party.
